BOOK REVIEWS

The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics, by Mark Lilla. New York: New York Review of Books, 2001, 229 pp., $24.95 hardbound.

James H. Nichols, Jr.

Should we expect intellectuals to be more than ordinarily thoughtful about politics? If we take *intellectual* in a very broad sense, such an expectation hardly seems warranted. Why, after all, should a mathematician or an engineer or a music critic be more knowledgeable about politics than anyone else? But if we are talking about philosophic intellectuals who are deeply concerned with human affairs, read widely and deeply, and devote their best efforts to the attempt to understand human beings and societies, it might well seem reasonable for us to expect abundant good sense, if not wisdom itself, in politics. Mark Lilla's lively and learned discussion of six twentieth-century intellectuals and their engagements with politics reminds us that such an expectation has often been sorely disappointed.

Lilla's book deals with a permanent problem, the relation of intellectual inquiry to political action. As his "Afterword: The Lure of Syracuse" makes clear, this problem has been variously mulled over by philosophers from Plato on down. At the same time, this book invites one to reflect on the distinctive character of late modernity that has brought about some peculiar features of this relation in these six cases. All six chapters deal with gifted and prominent thinkers and convey a clear sense of their central intellectual concerns and how those concerns led to political commitments.

Lilla suggests that his book can be viewed as a modest complement to Czeslaw Milosz's *The Captive Mind* (Knopf, 1953). The biggest difference, of course, is that while Milosz described intellectuals under the crushing pressure of coming to terms with the new Communist regime actually in power in Poland, Lilla by contrast deals for the most part with intellectuals living under liberal regimes who lent their support to tyrannical ones. Another difference arises from the fact that Milosz had deep personal knowledge of his four examples and lived through the same heartrending events as they; Lilla relies for the most part on the ordinary resources of intellectual biography (though he mentions his own attendance at a seminar given by Derrida in Paris in 1988–89).

Another difference between Milosz and Lilla is this. Milosz seems to have had in mind four different human types (whose actual names he withholds) in choosing his examples; Lilla's grounds for choosing Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Alexandre Kojève, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida are less clear. He mentions that he has chosen six out of a much larger universe of possible choices and has selected intellectuals from both sides of the Rhine and from both left and right. Certainly the breadth of his choices adds value to the book, in giving us grounds to hope that we may grasp something widely shared (if not universal) in the relationship of intellectual work to politics in the twentieth century. But Lilla leaves it mostly up to us

to reflect on what these examples have in common and how they differ. His afterword gives a generalized analysis of the sources of intellectuals' love of tyranny, but he does not argue for a typology nor present a developed argument comparing these several cases with each other.

A particularly striking difference among these several cases has to do with the character of the political entity with which each intellectual was involved. Two of them, Heidegger and Schmitt, dealt with a tyrannical regime actually in power (in addition to having produced writings that one might view as striving to prepare the way for that regime or something like it). Others gave less particularized support to some prospective tyranny of the left, ranging from Benjamin's desire to develop and promote Marxism in himself and the world, to Foucault's welcoming of every sign of transgressive revolution (in 1968 and its aftermath), to Derrida's more recent evocation of a kind of mystical or messianic leftist justice.

While each of these cases is certainly special, Kojève stands apart from the others in this dimension. On the one hand, he supported an actual tyrannical regime, namely Stalin's—and, as the French say, *en pleine connaissance de cause*, that is, with full knowledge of what was going on, including Stalin's murderously harsh measures. But Kojève's left-Hegelian reasons for that support led him not toward blind attachment to the Soviet Union but toward what Lilla calls "a refined philosophical neutrality in what would later be called the cold war." He saw both socialist and capitalist societies as moving toward the same end of history—what he called the universal and homogeneous state or what Lilla calls "a rational organized bureaucratic society without class distinctions." In the fifties, Kojève moved away from strong support of the Soviet Union as the leading edge of the working out of history's end to clear recognition of the fact that the United States had progressed further along that path. Perhaps most distinctive of Kojève among these six intellectuals was his serious involvement, as government official and adviser to presidents and ministers, in practical affairs: postwar European reconstruction, the development of the European Union, GATT, and policies towards developing countries. As Lilla comments:

> It is difficult to think of a significant European thinker of the last century who played an equivalent role in the shaping of European politics, or a statesman with comparable philosophical ambitions. (116)

Thus while Kojève's political stance is certainly shocking, I am not sure it is reckless, or if it is, its recklessness seems different from the others'.

Lilla's "Afterword: The Lure of Syracuse" seeks to develop an overall understanding of the phenomenon in question, which some have called the totalitarian temptation and to which Lilla gives the more broadly applicable term philotyranny. His evocation of Plato's efforts to educate a Syracusan tyrant does not assimilate Plato's experience to these modern examples but convincingly distinguishes Plato's stance toward politics from theirs. Plato did not favor, support, or place far-

reaching hopes in tyranny. Given the existence of tyranny, however, and the possibility that his influence might enlighten and thus improve an actual tyrant and thereby the lot of his citizens, Plato made the (unsuccessful) effort. By contrast, these six modern cases all supported tyrannical regimes and looked to them for decisive political improvement over existing more moderate (however flawed) regimes.

Why have some modern intellectuals (even philosophers) inclined toward tyranny instead of maintaining the moderate political stance of a Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, or Aquinas (or a Locke, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, or Mill)? From various sources in intellectual history Lilla notes two sets of contradictory explanations. On the one hand, one can view this tendency toward totalitarianism as a consequence of extreme Enlightenment hopes, an unbalanced commitment to what rationalism can bring about to improve the human lot. But on the other hand, the romantic rebellion against the Enlightenment together with passionate commitment to particular national or cultural traditions seems also to be a source for intellectuals' immoderate political projects. Or again: this phenomenon may seem to arise from an intellectual's thought being too politicized; but one may also think of cases where an intellectual, devoted for instance to a conception of inwardness, has taken politics too little seriously and so through inadequate knowledge of politics becomes vulnerable to the allure of some tyrannical regime and its extremist claims.

Dissatisfied with these competing explanations, Lilla offers another based on Plato's psychology of the philosopher and the tyrant. As the *Republic* makes clear, both philosopher and tyrant are dominated by *eros*, by erotic love. The philosopher's erotic love is one and unified; it aims upwards, toward genuine knowledge of truth (as something eternal and unchanging); and the philosopher's life is single-minded and harmonious. By contrast, the tyrant's erotic love is multifarious and base, directed downward to things in this bodily realm of constant flux; and his life is conflicted and inharmonious. Philosopher and tyrant share the experience of being led by a mad erotic passion, which tears them away from conventionally-held opinions and restraints; but, as Lilla expounds it, the philosopher remains somehow self-controlled and so aimed upward, while the tyrant, dominated by his erotic passions, is dragged down.

This account seems a sound Platonic way of distinguishing the genuine philosopher from the sophist or intellectual who, motivated not by genuine love of truth but by desire for wealth, fame, and the like, lies open to the allure of tyranny. It would thus seem to follow that genuine philosophers, unlike sophists or less than truly philosophic intellectuals, are not liable to political extremism or philotyranny. While this distinction between real philosophers and intellectuals or sophists may indeed be crucial for understanding the basic issue, I wonder about its application to the six cases under consideration here. In particular, I do not feel able to assure myself that Heidegger and Kojève are not genuine philosophers. Leo Strauss, for instance, who thought

much and deeply about the character of the philosophic life and about the difference between philosophers and intellectuals (and whom no one could ever suspect of being soft on Stalin or even Marxism), expressed a judgment in *On Tyranny* (University of Chicago Press, 2000) that Kojève is in fact that rare being, a philosopher. And Strauss and Kojève, though holding political and philosophical positions fundamentally opposed to each other's, both considered Heidegger to be perhaps the most profound thinker of the century.

The political extremism of at least some of the six examples Lilla treats, then, may not be adequately explained through the distinction between sophist and philosopher. And so, in spite of the contradictions rightly noted by Lilla, one turns back to considering the character of twentieth-century thought for clues. Hard though it is to generalize on this matter, a widely applicable clue, I think, comes from Nietzsche's observation (in *Beyond Good and Evil,* Section 53) that "the religious instinct is indeed in the process of growing powerfully—but the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep suspicion." A longing for what transcends our experienced reality, or even a quest for some messianic fulfillment or salvation, seems deeply rooted in these thinkers' purposes. But given the atheistic tendency of dominant modern philosophy (most famously evoked, of course, in Nietzsche's proclamation that God is dead), these thinkers seek this fulfillment in political change or most typically revolution. To put it another way, these thinkers powerfully condemn the reality of life in liberal societies; in fact for some of them the most powerful element in their thought may be the harsh accusation of liberal society. Such accusation, however, only makes sense in light of a demanding law, such as a divine law, by which society can properly be judged and condemned. While no such divine law is articulated by these thinkers, the harshness or extremism of their condemnation itself points to its rootedness in a religious (if atheistic) source.

Lilla's chapters show that all these thinkers (Kojève again perhaps excepted) are moved by strong dissatisfaction with life in liberal societies and a longing, in at least some cases messianic, for something more deeply fulfilling. The interest and difficulty of this problem come from the tension we face, which in modern times is most often discussed as the conflict between idealism and realism. On the one hand: to avoid an extremism or a utopianism that is destructive in practice, we surely want to be realistic, to accept the real necessities that face us in the world. On the other hand: we do not want simply to accept whatever exists in every respect, in ourselves or in our world; such a stance is rightly considered base and variously known as passivity, complacency, or philistinism. High aspiration is valuable, provided it does not issue in destructive folly.

What remedy could mitigate this terrible tension? Surely, as Lilla suggests, some kind of self-control or moderation is needed. But what kind of moderation is it, and how can it be promoted? To the extent that such a virtue can be acquired by study, I should think it would be knowledge of the nature of

human beings and of politics, knowledge of what is really possible for human beings in their political communities. My favorite short statement on the need for moderation thus understood comes from an essay by Leo Strauss on "Liberal Education and Responsibility" (*Liberalism Ancient and Modern*, Basic Books, 1966). Considering how well educated both Marx and Nietzsche were, one might well fear that philosophy provides no reliable support at all for moderation. Strauss, however, suggests:

> Perhaps one can say that their grandiose failures make it easier for us who have experienced those failures to understand again the old saying that wisdom cannot be separated from moderation and hence to understand that wisdom requires unhesitating loyalty to a decent constitution and even to the cause of constitutionalism. Moderation will protect us against the twin dangers of visionary expectations from politics and unmanly contempt for politics. Thus it may again become true that all liberally educated men will be politically moderate men.

The subsequent experience of the twentieth century, notably that discussed by Lilla, makes plain that the lesson regarding wisdom and moderation, while perhaps easier to learn than at some earlier time, remains difficult enough. Certainly it is as needful now as ever, especially when so many contemporary thinkers would have us dismiss the very concept of human nature as illusory and when scientists hold before us the prospect of overcoming human nature itself. Lilla's book confronts us with our need to rethink the problem of intellectual life and politics, learning what we can from the most profound thinking we can find, from Plato on down.

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The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling the Corporate University and Creating True Higher Learning by Stanley Aronowitz. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2000, 238 pp., $26.00 hardbound, $14.00 paperback.

Michael E. Kellman

The unexpected success in 1987 of Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* struck a real nerve, opening a stream of troubled reflection on American higher education that shows no signs of abating.[1] A common feature of that emanating from leftish academics is a ritualistic mild denunciation of Bloom, which largely accepts the validity of his critique. Reading sociologist Stanley Aronowitz's *The Knowledge Factory* gave me the sense of a bit of a time warp, of a 1960s radical union organizer's rambling takeoff on Bloom. But it would be a mistake

simply to dismiss this book. For Aronowitz has some interesting things to say, not least to those conservatives who believe, or once believed, that the market holds the answers to the woes of the academy. Amidst dubious claims about the supposed lack of education funding and opportunity for today's graduates, he charges that there is little today that qualifies as higher learning, and calls for "dismantling the knowledge factory." He presents ideas for a genuinely reformed general education curriculum: a somewhat radicalized great books approach, with a good dollop of what might be called "serious multiculturalism"—along with some of the usual variety.

Off-center though his diagnosis may appear in crucial respects, it should prod those sympathetic to the market to look for the source of the crisis in the philistinism of much of the right, as well as the barbarism of the left. I will suggest that there is a symbiosis whose recognition is an essential step in the restoration of the American university. (Some related themes have been developed by Carol Ianonne in this journal.[2])

Aronowitz's detailed critique begins with the historical survey "Higher Education or Higher Training?" of Chapter 2. He traces the growth of mass higher education to the need for trained workers in the burgeoning society of industry and scientific agriculture of nineteenth-century America. This process, already underway in the Civil War with the beginning of the land grant colleges, had really picked up steam by the early twentieth century. Aronowitz cites Thorstein Veblen's attack on what now would be called the "dumbing down" of higher learning in the nascent American research university, brought about by the partly antagonistic demands of the industrial economy. He might also have noted the contemporary plaints of Irving Babbitt, who favored a type of education a lot closer than Veblen to that which he recommends. These early critiques should remind us that the dissolution of certain ideals of education was underway long before the Cold War, or the 1960s. But the dedication of the university to the purposes of the industrial economy and state did vastly accelerate with World War II. The culmination of this in the Cold War was heralded by Clark Kerr, chancellor of the University of California during the Berkeley uprising, who coined, apparently without irony, the term "knowledge industry," from which Aronowitz derives the more disdainful "Knowledge Factory."

Aronowitz recalls (on page 37) Bloom's 1987 lamentation for the loss of institutions devoted to "the goal of human completeness." He decries the dissolution in the aftermath of the 1960s of general education, and as he later describes it, the related decline in status of tenured faculty, adjuncts, and teaching assistants. One almost senses a nostalgia, never quite ascribed to Bloom himself, for the heady days of the 1960s Cold War. When the universities were freshly awash in government money and less beholden than now to commercial interests, to young leftish faculty all things good must have seemed briefly possible with the student uprising. (It is worth remember-

ing that Bloom's critique was incubated in the crucible of the late 1960s at Cornell. As is evident from his less well-known essays in the collection *Giants and Dwarfs*, Bloom at first was by no means entirely unsympathetic to the student radicals.[3])

If Aronowitz's critique up to the 1960s has a certain acuity, his account begins to go seriously haywire when he turns to the current financial and social circumstances of institutions, faculty, and, especially, students. In the rambling Chapter 5 "Who gets in, who's left out of colleges and universities," he is dismayed by the lowering of standards in secondary education, but seems oblivious to the large share of blame that belongs squarely with higher education faculties and institutions. Instead, he levels his wrath at stingy and inequitable funding of elementary and secondary schools, decrying "a quarter century of severe budget constraints in public education." One wonders what budgets he is looking at and what he makes of the demonstrated irrefrangibility of educational problems to infusions of money.

He blames the stinginess of legislatures and taxpayers for much of the trouble in higher education as well, including exploitation and loss of authority of the faculty. However, he presents almost no evidence or quantitative analysis to back up the claims of budgetary woe. It should not be too difficult to dig up the relevant facts, especially for a sociologist. How are public and private universities really doing financially? A further line of inquiry is how the available funds are being used. Aronowitz rails against the bureaucratic bloat typical of today's university. (In this the faculty could make common cause with suspicious taxpayers and legislators.) But what really are the facts? In the parlance of university accounting, what is the share of budgets devoted to Instruction and Academic Support? What is the share devoted to faculty? How is this changing over time? Universities have fairly standardized accounting procedures, and at least at public universities, this kind of information is available with a little digging. But the reader will not find it here.

His remedy for inequality and lowering of standards is abolition of private universities, an end to tuition, and an end to colleges devoted to producing workers trained to serve corporate needs. This last he deems eminently practical, because inevitable: "the standards/access war comes at a time when good jobs in America are disappearing" (121) so "the end of an academic system devoted to providing masses of qualified labor for corporate America is near" (123). Even at the scandal-filled end of a bubble at the end of a spectacular boom, one is tempted to leave *The Knowledge Factory* and return to the real world. But it's worth reading on, for under the dated left-labor moss, there is quite a lot to Aronowitz's critique.

Half-hearted protestations notwithstanding, corporations do want, or at least are quite content with legions of narrowly trained, blinkered graduates. What might be called the "market university" caters to the immediate wants of the "customers"—the students, public, legislators, and corporate and gov-

ernment bureaucracies. What the various customers generally want, with their conflicting but all-too-human motives, is high grades, not-too-demanding courses, professors eager for good evaluations, high graduation rates, and workers who are reasonably skillful, pliant, and well-adjusted.

The surprising thing about this is that anyone should be surprised. The corporate economy is great at gratifying wants, at providing cars, comfortable housing, futuristic weapons and medical care, inexpensive food and entertainment, at least for the four-fifths or so of the population who are still up to the game. But it is no secret that satisfying wants does not necessarily bring forth nobility, piety, wisdom, intellectual profundity, truth, or beauty. It's as insane to expect the market university automatically to cultivate the serious life of the mind as to think that the market necessarily has an elevating influence on music, architecture, manners, entertainment, and public discourse. Even science shows increasing tendencies toward becoming "Baconized," with the frontiers being pushed forward collectively by masses of technicians, rather than the towering figures of the not-so-distant past.

All this Aronowitz sees fairly clearly, perched in his leftist aerie. The problem is that he is pretty much blind to the role of the left in the self-destruction of the academy. This occurred first in capitulation to the students in the 1960s, then the dissolution of the curriculum, and finally in acquiescence and collusion with the market society. If this seems counterintuitive, especially the last, some explanation is called for.

The beginning of the calamity appears above all the result of an internal loss of nerve, especially within the humanities. One thinks of the poignancy of Lionel Trilling's Jefferson address in the pivotal time of 1972.[4] Loss of nerve or not, the humanities and social science faculty could have kept a coherent system of pedagogy in place, at least for their own students. The natural scientists have done so to this day. But the scientists deserve their own share of the blame. Smug in their confidence that the important stuff would be unaffected by what happened to the rest of the campus, and lacking the courage to try to stop it anyway, they were content to watch the humanistic disciplines self-destruct. They also acquiesced in the watering down of science and mathematics requirements for the non-science students. They were probably not unhappy to see this, having plenty to keep them busy, what with their well-funded research programs and the science students, especially graduate students aiding their research.

If the professors caved easily to the student radicals, with their rock music, dope, demands for relevance, and student evaluations, it didn't work out quite the way either professors or students expected. Soon the Vietnam War was over, for the Americans if not the Vietnamese. It was time for the student radicals to grow up and for the universities to try to pick up the pieces. The radicals didn't just go away, as many of the liberal professors hoped they would. Newly ensconced in the faculty, the radicals soon had to make their accommodations with the various university constituencies. Radical nihilism

was not a counter for very long to philistinism, let alone the organizing and productive power of the market. You can't fight something with nothing.

For their part, mainstream society and business adjusted all too easily. Two or three decades on, it's as if an unmentionable deal was struck, whereby the left was ceded the culture, free to wage a relentless assault on the remnants of traditional and high culture, the norms of social life, morality, aesthetics, and reason that might compete, however precariously, with the values of the modern mass society. In return, the market gets graduates trained in narrow, yet often amorphous "skills"—no need to worry about people who might distract themselves with higher things, let alone question what it was all about. Plus, the market gets most of the really important stuff, the money and (it thinks) the power! There's some tension, but by and large it's a pretty cozy arrangement. The university really is a microcosm, distorted to be sure, of the larger system of which it partakes. No more ivory tower—that was the demand of the 1960s radicals. Instead of the radical sandbox, we really did get the knowledge factory, periodically reinvented and rehabilitated as needed to keep the stakeholders happy. The split within the university between the hard technocratic work and a largely debased soft humanistic culture mirrors an analogous split in the larger society.

Though far more aware of the role of the market society in the educational debacle than that of the academy itself, Aronowitz nonetheless has some interesting ideas for a genuinely reformed general education program. The final Chapters 6 and 7 contain the heart of his critique, and his proposals for a reformed curriculum. He presents a sympathetic reading of Bloom, essentially granting Bloom's attribution of the loss of the "heart of undergraduate education" to the loss of belief in "transhistorical truth" (133–134). However, I think he misreads Bloom in several crucial respects, a point to which I will return.

He gives a perceptive if somewhat disjointed analysis of the shifting general education and core curriculum programs on offer at major universities. The focus is on two exemplars of the contemporary scene: the once-stellar core program at the University of Chicago; and the core at Harvard, with its rather different goals. Aronowitz follows Bloom in claiming that the Chicago core had undergone a long devolution even before its recent downsizing at the hands of an administration concerned with marketing the University in the 1990s. Even so, he clearly thinks that what is left at Chicago is a lot better than what is on offer in the core at Harvard and elsewhere, with a supposed emphasis on methods and "skills," rather than the substance of what is being taught.

In Chapter 7 "Dismantling the Corporate University" he presents his ideas for a "philosophical and conceptual basis for a curriculum and pedagogy whose aim is to foster learning, even wisdom" (155). Some really bad warmed-over ideas for university governance, mixed in with more left-wing economic and social analysis, are fol-

lowed by his much more interesting ideas for curricular reform. He advocates an undergraduate core program for the first two years, consisting mainly of readings from canonical works, plus authors of distinction such as Joseph Needham and Thomas Kuhn, whose works might not fall under that august rubric.

He is at pains to distinguish his approach from those of conservatives (169), even while acknowledging a large degree of convergence as to the purpose and scope of the canon, and the intended constituency. He wants his program to be available not just at elite institutions, but "third-tier" institutions as well. I believe this is a red herring; "great books" programs are being offered at institutions that are decidedly not elite.[5] I think Aronowitz's approach to the canon is distinct, but not so much as he believes. He seriously misreads Bloom as regarding the great books as "sacred texts," rather than visions of clashing worldviews; as wanting to exclude authors after Hegel; and most critically, as wishing to exclude texts from civilizations other than the West, when in fact Bloom urgently insisted the opposite.[6]

His basic proposal (on page 177) is to explore specific historical periods with a view to bringing out their internal development and mutual interaction. He strongly desires to open up the curriculum to non-Western writers. His plan is for six year-long courses divided along historical/geographical lines: (1) the ancient Greeks including the pre-Socratics; (2) ancient Eastern civilizations and their interaction with the West (he makes the interesting point that concern with this actually faded in the twentieth-century university, with matters not improving with contemporary multiculturalism); (3) the feudal/medieval world including Judaic and Muslim influences; (4) industrialism and science in modernity; (5) the modern philosophical/literary world; and (6) the twentieth century. This last is tinged with contemporary multiculturalism. It is long on subalterns, detective fiction, Fanon; short on the struggle against communism and the achievement of the democratic capitalist world.

Aronowitz definitely sees a place for science. Not completely opposed to mainstream technical education, he would like to see it broadened. In his core program, the interest appears to be primarily the social and historical significance, not the content or substance of science. One gets the feeling he wants to study Einstein and Heisenberg more for the social context of relativity and uncertainty than to learn about space-time or quantum phenomena. I can attest to the rewards of the suggested reading of Galileo, Newton, and Lavoisier, but for a young person embarking on a career based on modern natural science, this would make for very rough passage. Anybody wanting to take up science, engineering, or medicine would have to take the full complement of standard introductory math and science courses. This would be difficult, because Aronowitz says that ideally his core would completely fill the first two years. It would be possible though for science students to follow his program over a longer time.

I believe with Aronowitz (and Bloom) that a heightened emphasis on

civilizations other than the West, especially the modern West, is desirable. With the changing makeup of the student body, the evident slide of Europe, the growing heft of other cultures, and the very globalization decried by many leftists, it is probably inevitable. The great danger is a preoccupation with aspects of other cultures that in actuality reflect the most parochial tendencies of the contemporary West. An aspiration to a "serious multiculturalism"—an attentive encounter with texts and worldviews of other civilizations, as well as the pre-modern West, not a rejection or supersession of the modern West—seems vastly preferable to the present multiculturalism, cultural studies, and critical theory. The problem, of course, is where to fit all this into the curriculum.

I think that Aronowitz's core offers a genuine alternative to the defects of the knowledge factory or market university. To repeat, it is crazy to blame these entirely on the market economy. The left did at least as much in the 1960s to destroy the university as the builders of the knowledge factory did in the century before. At least the curriculum had genuine substance and a degree of comprehensiveness, even if it lacked the coherence and seriousness desired by Aronowitz.

On the other hand—getting back to the left-right symbiosis—much of the trouble with the market university lies in the perverse incentives that prevail when monetary or even baser values have highest standing. Again, it was largely the flight from reason and responsibility that opened the void. But it was naive in the extreme for some friends of traditional culture to think that on its own the market would heal the breach. If anything, "marketization" is now powering the university's worst tendencies. It is clear that it is fatal for the academy to allow itself to become just another business. Experience shows that some institutions do very well in the market when they remember that they must remain somewhat apart, precisely so they can offer a corrective and alternative. The evangelical churches and the Marine Corps come to mind—though the contemporary academy may be reluctant to take these as exemplary institutions!

Be that as it may, the friends of learning are going to have to think hard about how to leverage the market for their own ends, as in fact all successful businesses do. This means first of all curbing the most blatantly perverse incentives. A good place to start would be to rein in grade inflation. Another ripe target is the tyranny of student evaluations. A conscious decision not to be mesmerized by student credit hour budget models would be helpful. These systems undoubtedly have their virtues, but inevitably have warping tendencies as well. At the crudest level, they create incentives for watered-down courses and programs. Pressures from legislatures and trustees to boost "productivity" by increasing retention and graduation rates (the knowledge factory again!) create obvious incentives to degrade standards.

On a more positive note, resourceful institutions, as well as smaller groups of faculty, can leverage the market to create unusual programs that will

appeal to various groups of students. A good example is the kind of modified "great books" approach favored by Aronowitz. Generally operating at a lesser level of coherence, honors programs and colleges within public universities are extremely welcome among the better students and their parents. Another example at my own institution is an innovative "Pathways" program that aims to provide a variety of coherent sequences, each organized around a central theme, during the first two years.[7] At a lower level of student self-selection, but with likely resonance for a wider public, general education is in desperate need of reform. As documented by a National Association of Scholars study, general education requirements have disintegrated since the 1960s.[8] Today they are a farce—no other word for it—even at most "quality" institutions; Aronowitz's critique of core programs is, if anything, understated. It's no wonder that horror stories proliferate of graduates ignorant of the rudiments of history, art, science, and mathematics. There's an opportunity to make a stellar impact even (or especially) for some middling institution, by leading the way with a seriously reformed program of general education.

This sketch is obviously just a start. What remedy there is for the state of the academy will have to occur within the contours of the market university. Those of left, right, and center who want to preserve a traditional vision of culture and learning will have to figure out how to harness market forces to serve their own ends. I believe those ends are both different from, and not entirely incompatible with the market society. It will take a recognition of this by the friends of traditional learning, with all the ambiguities entailed.

Notes

1. Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).
2. Carol Iannone, "Turning From Truth to Dubious Pursuits," *Academic Questions,* vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 14.
3. Allan Bloom, *Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1990).
4. Lionel Trilling, *Mind in the Modern World,* Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities, 1972 (New York, Viking Press, 1973).
5. Bruce M. Gans, "Inviting the Deprived to the Feast," *Academic Questions,* vol. 15, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 32.
6. Bloom, *Giants and Dwarfs,* 29.
7. http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~pathway/
8. Stephen H. Balch and Rita C. Zurcher, *The Dissolution of General Education: 1914-1993* (Princeton: National Association of Scholars, 1996).

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